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GENERIC ENTRY JUJITSU: INNOVATION AND QUALITY IN  
DRUG MANUFACTURING
W. Nicholson Price II*
The manufacturing side of the pharmaceutical industry has been neglected in innovation theory and 
policy, with the unfortunate result of stagnant manufacturing techniques driving major problems for 
the healthcare system. This innovation failure has roots in ineffective intellectual property incentives 
and high regulatory hurdles to innovative change. Changes in pure regulation or intellectual proper-
ty incentives have significant potential to help the innovation deficit, but are not the only possibility 
for change. A relatively minor regulatory change could harness the powerful dynamics of pioneer/
generic competition surrounding generic drug market entry. If pioneer firms were permitted to make 
label claims committing to specific manufacturing quality standards above those required by regula-
tion, generics would need to match those standards to match the pioneer label and win approval. 
This would create incentives for both pioneers and generics to improving manufacturing control and 
quality capabilities, ideally leading to a virtuous manufacturing quality arms race with benefits for 
both the healthcare system and industry itself.
* Assistant Professor, University of New Hampshire School of Law. J.D., Columbia Law School, 2011.  Ph.D. 
(Biological Sciences), Columbia Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2010.  A portion of this work was 
completed while an Academic Fellow at Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioeth-
ics at Harvard Law School.  I wish to thank Ana Bracic, I. Glenn Cohen, C. Scott Hemphill, Aaron Kesselheim, 
Michelle Mello, and Ben Roin for their helpful comments and feedback.
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Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is closely studied, but that study has largely 
missed an important part of the industry: the process of actually manufacturing drugs for distribution 
and sale. Scholars and lawmakers typically focus on the discovery and development of new drugs, 
considering the incentives for pioneer manufacturers to develop new drugs,1 the timing of generic 
drug entry and various techniques used by pioneer firms to delay that entry,2 and the impact of 
regulatory barriers to new drug entry.3 These are undoubtedly crucial issues in intellectual property 
and innovation theory, especially since the pharmaceutical industry is exceptional among industries 
in the importance of patents to driving innovation.4 However, in an industry centered on innovation, 
manufacturing is stagnant: some plants have been running continuously for decades with limited 
upgrades or changes.5 Old plants have shed metal shavings and glass into drugs,6 and use few, if any, 
modern production techniques.7 The intense focus of scholars and policymakers on drug discovery 
and market entry has obscured the major innovation deficiency in pharmaceutical manufacturing. 
Drug manufacturers across the industry rely on outdated plants and techniques to make their 
drugs, resulting in expensive and inefficient manufacturing, which frequently fails to guarantee high-
quality drug products.8 Manufacturers have inadequate incentives to invest in innovative, robust 
ways to manufacture drugs.9 
1. See, e.g., Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 95 
(1996); Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 
Mo. L. Rev. 645 (2011).
2. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. Econ. 
& Mgmt. Strategy 75 (1997); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Ef-
fective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. Health Econ. 327 (2012); Haiden A. Huskamp, Julie M. Donohue, 
Catherine Koss, Ernst R. Berndt & Richard G. Frank, Generic Entry, Reformulations, and Promotion of SSRIs, 26 
Pharmacoeconomics 603 (2008).
3. Ron A. Bouchard, Jamil Sawani, Chris McLelland, Monika Sawicka & Richard W. Hawkins, The Pas de Deux of 
Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1461 (2009); Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 345 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 503, 545–56 
(2009); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 Mgmt. Sci. 173, 173, 175 n.8 (1986).
5. Janet Woodcock & Marta Wosinska, Economic and Technological Drivers of Generic Sterile Injectable Drug 
Shortages, 93 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 170, 173 (2013). 
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Thomas Friedli et al., Operational Excellence in the Pharmaceutical Industry 24–25 
(2006); Lawrence X. Yu, Pharmaceutical Quality by Design: Product and Process Development, Understanding, and 
Control, 25 Pharmaceutical Res. 781, 786 (2008).
8. See generally Friedli et al., supra note 7, at 24–77. Research-oriented pioneer drug companies 
spend around twice as much on manufacturing drugs as they do on research and development, while 
generic firms typically spend over half of their revenues on manufacturing expenses. Prabir Basu, 
Girish Joglekar, Saket Rai, Pradeep Suresh & John Vernon, Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in Pharma-
ceutical Companies, 3 J. Pharmaceutical Innovation 30, 33 (2008).
9. See W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 
55 B.C. L. Rev. 491, 516-529.
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This innovation failure in drug manufacturing results in significant problems for the health 
care system, including high levels of drug recalls and continuing shortages of essential drugs.10 2011 
saw the highest number of recalls ever, with over 2300, and 2012, 2010, and 2009 were also in the 
top four recall years.11 Most recalls were due to contamination during manufacturing.12 In a closely 
linked problem, shortages, including of front-line chemotherapeutics and other essential drugs, fre-
quently occur when plants or production lines shut down to remedy quality problems, or when drugs 
are recalled and new production cannot fill the demand.13 The increasing number of shortages affects 
the vast majority of hospitals, changing care patterns and increasing costs,14 costing an estimated 
$416 million per year.15  
FDA’s direct oversight role can help alleviate the symptoms of the industry’s innovation 
problems, but only in limited ways. FDA can try to reduce quality problems through inspection pro-
grams, but its inspection force cannot be everywhere and can only enforce basic safety and efficacy 
requirements in overseeing manufacturing. Plants are inspected on average only every two and a half 
years16—and that spacing jumps to every seven to thirteen years for overseas plants.17 Many plants, 
both domestic and foreign, may never have been inspected.18 
Shortages are even harder for FDA to address directly. Although FDA can speed inspections, 
encourage other manufacturers to pick up the slack, or work with firms to resolve problems, ulti-
mately the agency cannot require companies to produce drugs.19
The two problems also interact negatively in the context of direct FDA action. Cracking 
10. Barbara K. Gehrett, A Prescription for Drug Shortages, 307 JAMA 153, 153 (2012)
11. Bowman Cox, Contamination, Mix-ups Drive up Drug Recall Totals for 2012, Gold Sheet (2013).
12. Id.
13. Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 5, at 170–71.
14. Sandra L. Kweder & Susie Dill, Drug Shortages: The Cycle of Quantity and Quality, 93 Clinical Pharmacol-
ogy & Therapeutics 245, 245 (2013)245 (2013.
15. Shortages cause an estimated $216 million annual increase in labor costs required to work around shortages. 
Rola Kaakeh, Burgunda V. Sweet, Cynthia Reilly, Colleen Bush, Sherry DeLoach, Barb Higgins, Angela M. Clark 
& James Stevenson, Impact of Drug Shortages on U.S. Health Systems, 68 Am. J. Health-System Pharmacy 
1811, 1814 (2011). Increased drug payments and shipping costs total an estimated $200 million annually. Coleen 
Cherici, Jerry Frazier, Marv Feldman, Bruce Gordon, Christina A. Petrykiw, Wayne L. Russell & Jay Souza, Navi-
gating Drug Shortages in American Healthcare: A Premier Healthcare Alliance Analysis, Prem. Inc March (2011).
16. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-961, Drug Safety: FDA Has Conducted More For-
eign Inspections and Begun to Improve Its Information on Foreign Establishments, but More Prog-
ress Is Needed (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-961 [hereinafter GAO-10-961].
17. U.S. FDA, Fact Sheet: New User Fees for Generic Drugs Will Enhance Americans’ Access to Less Expensive 
Drugs and Generate Major Cost Savings, http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFood-
DrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDASIA/ucm310992.htm (last modified 
Aug. 17, 2012)
18. See GAO-10-961, supra note 16, at 18 (finding that in FY2009, 64% of foreign drugs manufacturing sites and 
10% of domestic sites registered with FDA might never have been inspected).
19. Kweder & Dill, supra note 14, at 250–51.
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down on quality problems helps quality, but may cause shortages by closing plants, either directly or 
when a company decides that upgrades or repairs necessary to fix quality problems are too expensive 
to be worthwhile and instead stops production.20 FDA is required to take potential shortages into 
account when making regulatory decisions including quality, and may avoid enforcement actions 
that could result in shortages.21 Thus, FDA’s major enforcement tool for one problem—quality—is 
hampered by its need to combat another problem—shortages.22
More fundamentally, fixing problematic symptoms fails to address the underlying problem: 
the general absence of innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing. This innovation deficit has 
causes rooted both in complex regulatory barriers23 and in the absence of effective intellectual prop-
erty incentives.24 Potential solutions addressing these two sources are important avenues to address 
this multifaceted problem.25 However, another important potential avenue for improving innovation 
and quality is by changing regulatory structures so that market dynamics and competition between 
firms drives firms to innovate and improve quality.
One such solution, previously proposed, relies on providing more information to consum-
ers and allowing them to shape firm incentives through market mechanisms. FDA officials recently 
noted that domestic drug purchasers are unlikely to differentiate versions of the same drug based 
on production quality, which is hard for purchasers to observe.26 Instead, purchasers typically shop 
based on cost.27 This is especially true when purchasers choose among generics, which are supposed 
to be identical products. Choosing on quality criteria is particularly difficult for drugs like sterile 
injectables where quality failures may be obscured by other factors. The people who take sterile 
injectable drugs are frequently quite sick, so problems of drug quality may go uninvestigated as 
normal complications of the very ill.28 This manufacturing quality opacity limits market pressure for 
higher quality manufacturing. 
FDA and others have proposed providing quality grades to the market, much like the grades 
given in some jurisdictions to restaurants or health insurance plans.29 This approach could influence 
firm behavior, but the incentives it would create would be indirect, because they would be filtered 
through the lens of consumer preferences and would depend on consumers expressing manufactur-
ing quality preferences through purchasing decisions. Although consumers are responsive to quality 
20. Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 5, at 172–73.
21. Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 356D.
22. See Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 5, at 172.
23. See Price II, supra note 9, at 510-522.
24. See id. at 522-539.
25. See id. at 540-561 (proposing reforms to lower regulatory barriers, change intra-firm incentives through al-
tered regulatory regimes, and provide more effective intellectual property incentives through regulatory mecha-
nisms).
26. Woodcock & Wosinska, supra note 5, at 171–72.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 172.
29. Id. at 175; Stuart O. Schweitzer, How the US Food and Drug Administration Can Solve the Prescription Drug 
Shortage Problem, 103 Am. J. Pub. Health e10, e12–e13 (2013).
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signals in some other contexts,30 consumerism as a mechanism of quality control faces significant 
problems in healthcare.31 A 2000 Kaiser Family Foundation study found that only 12% of patients 
had used quality information to choose among hospitals, doctors, and health plans; government 
agencies were ranked far below doctors, family, or friends.32 For drugs they already have the quality 
signal of FDA approval to continue manufacturing, an absolute up-or-down signal, which could eas-
ily dominate comparatively minor quality gradations. In addition, the fragmented nature of phar-
maceuticals’ “consumer,” made up of insurers, prescribers, and patients, could hinder responses to 
quality signals due to the difficulty of accurately transmitting and valuing preferences among differ-
ent entities. In some cases, like injectable drugs, which are purchased by hospitals, any consumer-di-
rected packaging indications of manufacturing quality may be visible only to the purchasing hospital 
and not to the patient or care provider.
However, consumer preferences are not the only source of market competition. The phar-
maceutical industry focuses intensely on the timing and mechanics of generic entry into the market, 
when the pioneer company’s monopoly on a drug is opened to competition. Upon generic entry, the 
pioneer company typically loses market share quite rapidly, and the prices consumers pay sharply 
decrease.33 Pioneer companies engage in several distinct strategic behaviors to try to delay the entry 
of generic firms, including “evergreening” strategies to extend patent protection34 and reverse-pay-
ment settlements where pioneer firms pay generic firms to delay entering the market.35
30. Schweitzer, supra note 29, at e13.
31. See Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care?, 35 Am. J.L. & 
Med. 7, 48–59 (2009)  (noting the difficulties of healthcare consumerism, even assuming accurate and trustwor-
thy information is both provided to and understood by consumers); see also I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients 
with Passports: Medical Tourism and the Patient-Protective Argument, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1467, 1509–10 (2010) 
(reviewing literature on problems with information provision as a mechanism of quality control in healthcare).
32. The Kaiser Family Found./Agency for Health Care Research & Quality, National Survey on 
Americans as Health Care Consumers: An Update on the Role of Quality Information (2000), Charts 
10–12, 17 available at http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/kffchartbk00.pdf.
33. Notably, a drug’s average price decrease is largely due to lower prices for generics; the price of the brand-name 
drug manufactured by the pioneer company typically remains high, in a pattern of market segregation as op-
posed to pure commodity competition. Frank & Salkever, supra note 2, at 82–85, 89–90.
34. Patent evergreening strategies include obtaining patents on new crystal forms of existing drugs, single enan-
tiomers (left- or right-“handed” versions of molecules rather than a mixture of the two), new formulations (for 
instance, changing from a tablet to a capsule), or drug combinations, among others. Brian Whitehead, Stuart 
Jackson & Richard Kempner, Managing Generic Competition and Patent Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
3 J. Intell. Prop. L. Prac. 226, 227–29 (2008). For an examination of several strategies for maintaining market 
exclusivity in the context of a popular class of antidepressants, see Huskamp et al., supra note 2. For an empirical 
study of the effectiveness of such strategies, see Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 2.
35. In reverse-payment settlements, pioneer companies pay generic companies to delay market entry in the con-
text of a patent infringement suit. These settlements were recently considered by the Supreme Court in F.T.C. v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) and have been the subject of much scholarly attention. See, e.g., Lisa Allen, 
Reviewing the Legality of Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements: The FTC Doesn’t Get It Right, 8 Geo. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 245 (2010); Daniel A. Crane, Per Se Illegality for Reverse Payment Patent Settlements?, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 
575 (2010); Ronald W. Davis, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements: A View into the Abyss, and a Modest Proposal, 
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Altering the possible behavior of firms within the dynamic of generic entry could provide 
a novel and potentially more powerful incentive to drive firms to increase manufacturing quality. 
FDA could seek to tie quality improvement to a key point in the drug lifecycle: the market entry of 
generic drugs after patent expiration. If a branded-drug manufacturer proposed manufacturing qual-
ity commitments that would be included in the drug label, the legal requirement that generics use an 
identical label, and hence commit to identical quality standards, could provide incentives for manu-
facturing innovation in both brand and generic companies. For instance, a manufacturer could make 
a voluntary commitment to ensure that the amount of active pharmaceutical ingredient would vary 
no more than +/- 2% from the stated amount, rather than the +/- 10% generally allowed today.36 The 
manufacturer would need to demonstrate its compliance capability for the commitment to be includ-
ed on the label. For a generic to be approved, the generic’s maker would be required to demonstrate 
and commit to the higher level of manufacturing quality. 
This approach creates incentives for both branded and generic manufacturers to increase 
manufacturing quality. Branded-drug manufacturers create higher entry barriers for generics, which 
may prolong the period of monopoly pricing and may decrease the number of eventual generic en-
trants. However, to obtain this benefit, branded-drug makers must invest in higher-quality manufac-
turing. Generic companies, to avoid exclusion from the market, must similarly invest. Higher quality 
manufacturing in both sectors will have significant consumer benefits: reductions in recalls, con-
tamination events, and drug shortages, as well as other more speculative potential benefits of having 
more precisely manufactured drugs, such as reduced dosage variation.
Because generics will still compete on price, firms will have incentives to innovate to in-
crease quality while still keeping costs low. As the automotive, electronics, and other industries have 
demonstrated, production costs can decrease with better-controlled manufacturing even while quality 
increases.37 This dual-goal incentive contrasts with the current potential for “races to the bottom” in 
which quality can be sacrificed for the sake of cutting costs, as has been observed in outsourced drug 
manufacturing.38 
The goal of the proposed incentive mechanism is to spur a “race to the top,” in which manu-
21 Antitrust 26 (2006); Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements: Presumptions, 
Procedural Burdens, and Covenants Not to Sue Generic Drug Manufacturers, 26 Santa Clara Computer High 
Tech. L.J. 141 (2010).
36. See, e.g., U.S. FDA, Guidance for Industry: Investigating Out-of-Specification (OOS) Test Re-
sults for Pharmaceutical Production, 11 (2006), available at www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/
ucm070287.pdf (allowing 10% deviations).
37. See, e.g., George Byrne, Dave Lubowe & Amy Blitz, Using a Lean Six Sigma Approach to Drive Innovation, 
35 Strategy & Leadership 5 (2007) (case study of cost and quality improvements for Caterpillar equipment 
manufacturing); M. Soković, D. Pavletić & E. Krulčić, Six Sigma Process Improvements in Automotive Parts Pro-
duction, 19 J. Achievements Materials & Manufacturing Engineering 96, 100 (2006) (case study of auto-
motive part plant innovation resulting in higher quality and lower costs).
38. John V. Gray, Aleda V. Roth & Michael J. Leiblein, Quality Risk in Offshore Manufacturing: Evidence from the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 29 J. Operations Mgmt. 737, 745–48 (2011).
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facturers continually innovate to increase quality, and generics follow close behind to match quality 
and decrease manufacturing costs. In the process, innovation, robustness of manufacturing process-
es, and quality should increase across the industry.
The principal concern with this approach is that limits on generic entry will increase av-
erage prices and decrease patient access, which weighs against any benefits from higher quality 
manufacturing. At least some decreased generic entry, whether through delay or fewer entrants, is 
an inherent part of this mechanism; without such a decrease, there is no incentive for brand manu-
facturers to commit to higher quality. However, price increases—at least temporary ones—are the 
unfortunate but likely result of any proposal for increased quality that imposes costs on industry 
or offers incentives.39 Nonetheless, to the extent that “races to the top” are actually races, delays to 
generic entry are likely to shrink over time as generic firms become more innovative and flexible and 
can more easily match quality requirements. Similarly, once generic entry does occur, higher quality 
manufacturing will not necessarily result in higher marginal costs and prices, as demonstrated by the 
experience of other industries, where consumer products, electronics, and cars are all manufactured 
to higher quality without significantly increased costs as a result of manufacturing innovation. In the 
longer term, some prices might even decrease as manufacturing becomes more robust and eventually 
less expensive.
A related concern is that branded-drug makers might game the system. For instance, manu-
facturers might try to constantly add new requirements to keep pushing back generic entry. FDA 
could serve as a gatekeeper to address this problem by prohibiting serial quality commitments or 
requiring that such later additions be substantial.40 Alternately, manufacturers might commit to 
unnecessarily stringent quality conditions: investments that do not yield clinical benefits but make 
manufacturing prohibitively difficult or costly to restrain generic entry. FDA gatekeeping could 
similarly address this issue by ensuring that quality commitments are meaningful. However, even 
some quality standards without immediate clinical relevance, like reduced dosage variation in a 
drug, which operates similarly and safely across a relatively wide range of dosages, could still pro-
mote more robust and controlled manufacturing, which may have broader collateral benefits in other 
problem areas like contamination. 
More broadly, branded-drug manufacturers already have and energetically use tools to limit 
generic entry, but those tools generally do not improve manufacturing quality to benefit consumers. 
For example, manufacturers can already pursue unusual drug specifications or challenging formula-
tions, which are hard for generics to match and manufacture; empirically, fewer generics compete for 
difficult-to-manufacture products.41 But these approaches generally come without consumer benefits, 
and fail to incentivize meaningful innovation. Allowing a similar mechanism for label-based com-
39. Gehrett, supra note 10, at 154
40. A similar requirement exists today for biologics; after the first period of biologic market exclusivity, subse-
quent periods of exclusivity are unavailable for changes in formulation, indication, or strength, or for changes to 
the biologic, which do not change its safety, purity, or potency. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C) (2013).
41. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 613, 632–33 (2011).
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mitments to quality could drive innovation in manufacturing processes, resulting in tangible benefits 
to patients, providers, and the industry. 
This limited proposal is far from a panacea for the problems in drug manufacturing; many 
other factors are involved, including intellectual property incentives, industry culture, and regulatory 
barriers to innovative change, and other policy changes will be required as part of an overall solu-
tion.42 However, creating a way for improved quality to be valuable, not just to consumers, but also 
to drug companies, would be a step in the right direction.
Outside the context of drug manufacturing, this proposal adds to the quiver of possible 
innovation drivers. Many innovation incentives rely on providing extra rewards to innovative ac-
tors, whether those rewards come in the form of exclusivity, grants, tax rebates, or otherwise. This 
proposal suggests harnessing intra-industry competition regarding an existing reward—altering the 
timing of generic market entry—to drive innovation without significant external inputs. While there 
may be implementation problems not considered in depth in this Essay, using an industry’s proce-
dural creativity to drive substantive innovation offers an enticing possibility for change.
42. For a broader treatment of problems in drug manufacturing generally, see Price II, supra note 9.
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